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Blurred Lines—Intersexuality and the Law: 
An Annotated Bibliography*
Pat Newcombe**
This bibliography gathers, organizes, and annotates relevant law review articles 
(and one monograph) dealing with legal issues concerning intersexuality. Articles 
are included to introduce researchers to the intricacies involved in the discussion of 
intersexuality, to examine issues of medical interventions, and to explore possibilities 
of judicial relief within the existing framework.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Scope and Organization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Intersex  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Disorders/Differences of Sex Development  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Hermaphrodite  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Medical Intervention and Its Legal Framework  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Informed Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Medical Malpractice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Constitutional Rights  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Confines of a Binary System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Discrimination Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Discrimination in Sports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Intersex Activist Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Intersex Activist Movement Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
 * © Pat Newcombe, 2017. Many thanks to my colleagues Sudha Setty and Beth Cohen for 
reviewing this article and providing thoughtful comments and feedback. I am also grateful to my 
colleague Jennifer Levi for sending my article for review by Julie Greenberg, an internationally recog-
nized legal expert in the field of intersexuality. I am indebted to Julie for her advice and inspiration. A 
special thanks to my research assistant, Kathryn Mullin, for her assistance with this project. Respon-
sibility for any errors is mine alone. Additionally, I am most grateful for the work my excellent library 
staff does that makes it possible for me to pursue writing projects.
 **  Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Library and Information Resources, West-
ern New England University School of Law, Springfield, Massachusetts.
222 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 109:2  [2017-12]
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Intersection with Other Movements: LGBT and Same-Sex Marriage . . . . . . . 254
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Foreign Approaches to Intersex Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Genital Surgery Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
U.S. Reform/Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Annotated Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Introduction
¶1 Boy or girl? This is often the first question upon the birth of a child or upon 
learning of a pregnancy.
¶2 “Intersex” is an umbrella term for a variety of congenital conditions that lead 
to ambiguity about an individual’s biological sex. The physical effects can be subtle 
or clear. While genital ambiguity is the most obvious manifestation, intersex can 
present genetically, hormonally, or anatomically, as when internal reproductive or 
sexual anatomy does not conform to standard definitions of male or female.1 From 
the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, physicians determined sex 
solely based on an individual’s gonads: an individual with ovaries was considered a 
female, and an individual with testicles was considered a male.2 By the 1950s, the 
focus of sex determination moved to the appearance of the external genitalia.3 
Physicians considered intersexuality discovered at birth as an emergency requiring 
surgical intervention to “normalize” genitalia in affected infants to mitigate the 
stigma that may be associated with being perceived as sexually variant.4 There were 
two reasons for this development. First, physicians developed surgical methods to 
alter genitalia to look cosmetically consistent for the assigned sex. Second, it 
became a pervasive belief among the medical establishment that one’s gender iden-
tity was dependent on nurture not nature.5 Doctors did not believe that infants had 
an innate sense of being male or female; rather, this was learned behavior. 
Researchers theorized that if early genital-normalization surgery enabled parents 
to raise their child as the sex that matched the child’s genitals, the child would not 
 1. Hida Viloria, What Is Intersex?, OII-USA, http://oii-usa.org/1128/intersex/ [https://perma.cc 
/X24Q-K2P6]; see infra “Terminology,” ¶¶ 14–21, for a more complete definition.
 2. Julie A. Greenberg, Intersexuality and the Law: Why Sex Matters 15 (2012).
 3. Id.
 4. Id. at 15–17; see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental 
Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106 Pediatrics 138, 138 (2000) (“The birth of a child with 
ambiguous genitalia constitutes a social emergency.”). Surgery other than genital-normalization 
surgery may be medically necessary at times, however, to assist in bowel and bladder activity or 
when there is a risk of cancer, such as with nonfunctional testes. Catherine L. Minto et al., Long Term 
Sexual Function in Intersex Conditions with Ambiguous Genitalia, 14 J. Pediatric & Adolescent 
Gynecology 141, 141–42 (2001). 
 5. See, e.g., Joan G. Hampson et al., Hermaphrodism: Recommendations Concerning Case Man-
agement, 16 J. Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism 547 (1956).
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suffer gender identity confusion in spite of any differences in chromosomes or 
hormones.6
¶3 Without surgery, physicians were concerned that “abnormal” genitalia would 
make a child suffer deep psychological distress.7 Physicians also believed that inter-
sex genitalia made people uncomfortable and that parents would not be able to 
accept or bond with their intersex children unless the ambiguity was “erased” with 
such surgery.8 Because there was much stigma and shame surrounding this atypical 
condition, many families kept the condition secret. Parents were often told half-
truths about their child’s condition and were advised never to tell the child about 
his or her condition.9 Genital-normalization surgery became the standard of medi-
cal care for intersex infants. The choice, traditionally, has been which sex to assign 
to the baby, not whether to perform genital-normalization surgery.10
¶4 By the late 1990s, this medical protocol was challenged by intersex activists and 
experts in various disciplines, including law.11 Studies confirmed that one’s sense of 
being male or female relates more to brain and hormonal functions than the cosmetic 
appearance of one’s genitals, and therefore if the surgically altered genitalia did not 
conform to the child’s own sense of being male or female, a child would be greatly 
harmed.12 Additional evidence established that the irreversible surgical procedures 
had troubling risks, supported by numerous personal accounts of individuals with 
intersex traits who felt permanently scarred and traumatized.13 The procedures may 
have serious permanent effects, including sterility, a loss or diminishment of the abil-
ity to experience sexual pleasure, chronic pain or pain associated with dilation of a 
surgically created vagina, incontinence, lifetime mental suffering,14 and impairment 
 6. Alice Domurat Dreger, Ambiguous Sex—Or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the Treat-
ment of Intersexuality, Hastings Ctr. Rep., May/June 1998, at 24.
 7. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should 
Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 Mich. J. Gender 
& L. 1, 43–46 (2000).
 8. Id. at 44–45. 
 9. Julie A. Greenberg, Health Care Issues Affecting People with an Intersex Condition or DSD: Sex 
or Disability Discrimination?, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 849, 859 (2012).
 10. Emily Greenhouse, A New Era for Intersex Rights, New Yorker (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www 
.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-era-for-intersex-rights [https://perma.cc/GM56-U4W8].
 11. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 19.
 12. Id. Dr. John Money’s nurture over nature theory was debunked in 1997, when it was discov-
ered that what he reported as a “successful” experiment with his test of behavioralism was actually a lie. 
Id. See also Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term Review 
and Clinical Implications, 151 Archives Pediatric & Adolescent Med. 298, 300 (1997).
 13. Mireya Navarro, When Gender Isn’t a Given, N.Y. Times (Sept. 19, 2004), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2004/09/19/fashion/when-gender-isnt-a-given.html [https://perma.cc/E7RU-MNKS]; see also 
Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & the Law, 11 Annals Health L. 195, 
212–13 (2002) (stating that many individuals in one of the largest studies experienced psychological 
and identity issues).
 14. Many of these children suffer from depression, and some consider suicide as adults. There are 
many personal accounts, such as Jim Ambrose’s, who had an X and Y chromosome, but had surgery 
as an infant to have his genitals appear more female-like. He later took female hormones and had a 
vagina constructed. Jim obtained his medical records when he was an adult and discovered the cir-
cumstances of his birth. As an adult, he began to take testosterone shots and had surgery to remove 
his breasts. Greenhouse, supra note 10. Jim’s father remembers that the doctors did not make it appear 
as if there was much of a choice when Jim was an infant. The doctors said they could simply fix the 
problem. When Jim discovered that he was born intersex, Jim’s parents told Jim that they felt that were 
doing the best thing for him, but Jim was very angry about it. Id.
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of the parent-child relationship.15 In fact, the growing consensus was that no compel-
ling evidence supports a finding that the presumed social benefits of such “normal-
izing” surgery outweigh the potential costs.16 
¶5 Intersex activists advise against nonconsensual genital-normalization sur-
gery and counsel acceptance for affected children. It is perhaps an expected con-
tinuance of the gender-blurring evolution. Feminism and the gay and transgender 
rights movements have smoothed the path for greater acceptance of individuals 
who do not conform to the standard male or female model. Although the general 
public is often confused by the difference between intersex conditions and gender 
identity issues, they are quite distinct. As a starting point, reference to one’s gender 
identity describes the individual’s internal, deeply held sense of his or her identity 
as male or female, or neither; intersex involves biological characteristics. 
¶6 Currently, advocates are advancing efforts to alter the approach taken in plan-
ning healthcare for children with intersex traits. For example, the Gender and Sex 
Development program at Chicago’s Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hospital, 
launched three years ago, is one of several U.S. programs that uses a collaborative 
multidisciplinary care team of specialists experienced in this area: pediatric endocri-
nologists, urologists, surgeons, nurses, genetic counselors, neonatologists, pediatric 
gynecologists, ethicists, and child psychologists.17 The team works to assist families 
in weighing their options, including whether surgery should be contemplated at all. 
¶7 There is an increasing awareness of intersexuality today, which has led more 
families to explore treatment options. The new treatment approach results partially 
from a 2006 Consensus Statement on Intersex Disorders by U.S. and European 
medical specialists and intersex advocates who met to consider treatment proto-
cols, including genital-normalization surgery.18 The Consensus Statement advo-
cated a more cautious approach before proceeding with genital surgery, noting the 
resulting impact to quality of life, such as decreased sexual sensitivity. It also noted 
that evidence for early genital-normalizing surgery is not substantiated; promoted 
a more open dialog between patients and families, along with the provision of psy-
chosocial support; and encouraged patients’ and families’ participation in decision 
making.19 Although this Consensus Statement was a step in the right direction, it 
 15. “If such interventions are performed solely with a view to integration of the child into its 
family and social environment, then they run counter to the child’s welfare. In addition, there is no 
guarantee that the intended purpose (integration) will be achieved.” Swiss Nat’l Advisory Comm’n 
on Biomedical Ethics, On the Management of Differences of Sex Development: Ethical Issues 
Relating to “Intersexuality” 13 (Opinion No. 20/201, Nov. 2012), http://www.nek-cne.ch/file 
admin/nek-cne-dateien/Themen/Stellungnahmen/en/NEK_Intersexualitaet_En.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/DC6E-KGEA].
 16. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 864. There is still an absence of consistent psychosocial follow-
up. Lih-Mei Liao et al., Parental Choice on Normalising Cosmetic Genital Surgery: Between a Rock and 
a Hard Place, 351 BMJ h5124, h5124 (Sept. 28, 2015), http://aisdsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10 
/Liao-creighton-2015-bmj.h5124.full_.pdf.
 17. Differences of Sex Development, Anne & Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hosp. of Chi., https://
www.luriechildrens.org/en-us/care-services/conditions-treatments/disorders-of-sex-development 
/Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/R6JX-995F].
 18. Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 Pediatrics 
e488, e488 (2006).
 19. Id. at e490.
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did not recommend a cessation of genital-normalization surgeries, a point that 
activists criticize. 
¶8 The Consensus Statement recommendations are a natural outgrowth of the 
patients’ rights movement in U.S. medicine toward better communication between 
doctors and patients treatment that is more patient-focused. With intersex condi-
tions, communication between doctors and parents/patients is particularly laden 
with emotion and controversy, and not all families are ready to accept a change in 
treatment philosophy. Even after advisement on the risks and concerns of genital-
normalization surgery, some families still opt for the surgery due to deep-seated 
concerns that their children will be considered abnormal if they fail to take any 
immediate action.20 Unfortunately, genital-normalization surgery has a long his-
tory of acceptance in healthcare, and even after the 2006 Consensus Statement 
there was no abrupt change in medical practices.21 The Chicago consensus “does 
not seem to have percolated down to frontline care in many cases.”22 
¶9 In 2016, there was an update to the 2006 Consensus Statement.23 Most sig-
nificant is that the update notes that physicians working with families should be 
aware that there has been movement in recent years for legal and human rights 
bodies to increasingly emphasize the importance of maintaining patient autonomy. 
It also encourages that peer support be provided on a routine basis at the earliest 
possible time for parents, and integrated with clinical care to ease parental distress. 
Care recommendations include the use of a team approach, full disclosure to 
patients and parents, and a focus on the best possible outcome for quality of life.24 
¶10 Many physicians in the United States still regard genital-normalization sur-
gery as necessary to avoid psychological damage, and data supports that there is 
little change in practice.25 “There is still no consensual attitude regarding indica-
tions, timing, procedure and evaluation of outcome” of this surgery.26 The per-
ceived visibility of the intersex condition, along with the standardized reaction 
from the medical community and an expectant society has put much pressure on 
 20. Sarah M. Creighton et al., Childhood Surgery for Ambiguous Genitalia: Glimpses of Practice 
Changes or More of the Same?, 5 Psychol. & Sexuality 34, 41 (2014).
 21. There have been few reviews on the effect of the 2006 Consensus Statement, clitoral surger-
ies on children under the age of fourteen have increased since 2006, and “recent publications in the 
medical literature tend to focus on surgical techniques with no reports on patient experiences.” Id. 
at 38.
 22. Martha Henriques, Intersex: Seeking the Beauty in Difference, Mosaic: The Science of 
Life (Oct. 4, 2016), https://mosaicscience.com/story/intersex-DSDs [https://perma.cc/GA2E-FWXZ 
?type=image].
 23. Peter A. Lee et al., Global Disorders of Sex Development Update Since 2006: Perceptions, 
Approach and Care, 85 Hormone Res. Paediatrics 158 (2016).
 24. Id. at 160, 169–70.
 25. Alice Dreger, Malta Bans Surgery on Intersex Children, The Stranger: SLOG (Apr. 3, 
2015), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2015/04/03/22001053/malta-bans-surgery-on-intersex 
-children [https://perma.cc/8AL5-3ZY9]; see also Ellen K. Feder & Alice Dreger, Still Ignoring Human 
Rights in Intersex Care, 12 J. Pediatric Urology 436 (2016) (noting that issues have not progressed 
over the last twenty years, with clinical evidence still lacking and the standard of care remaining sub-
stantially the same). 
 26. Lee et al., supra note 23, at 176. Another 2016 publication reiterated numerous similar asser-
tions from the update, but eliminated mention of human rights concerns. Pierre D.E. Mouriquand et 
al., Surgery in Disorders of Sex Development (DSD) with a Gender Issue: If (Why), When, and How?, 12 
J. Pediatric Urology 139 (2016). 
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physicians and parents to take an aggressive and intrusive approach at an early age. 
However, it is possible that we are on the very brink of a sea change in the medical 
standard of care, as surgical practices have become a controversial issue in public 
and professional discussion, and as we now see legal and human rights institutions 
increasingly focus on patient autonomy. 
Scope and Organization
¶11 This annotated bibliography offers a survey of law review articles (and one 
monograph)27 to introduce researchers and scholars to the issues involved in the 
discussion of intersexuality and the law.28 Although there is limited scholarship in 
this area, it is a topic of burgeoning interest, and it is useful to review and update 
existing scholarship. The annotations include a brief summary of a particular focus 
within each article. In this way, the breadth of available scholarship in a wide vari-
ety of subject areas is provided. Before each grouping of annotations is an overview 
of each topic incorporating any available updated information.
¶12 Searching for legal literature on intersexuality requires the use of multiple 
words and phrases to describe the issues. All of the search terms listed below were 
used in compiling this annotated bibliography. The selected articles were compiled 
by conducting Westlaw searches using the following search terms in the title field: 
intersex!, hermaphrodit!, “genital normaliz!,” assign! /3 sex, disorder /2 “sex devel-
opment,” difference /2 “sex development,” DSD, sexing /4 child!, “third gender,” 
“ambigu! /2 sex, and “ambiguous genital!”29 
¶13 Since this issue is an evolving one of increasing awareness, articles are from 
2001 to the present. This annotated bibliography is divided into sections that cover 
resources that provide a background on the medical intervention for individuals 
with intersex traits and its legal framework, the confines of treating gender as a 
binary system, discrimination against intersex individuals, the human rights issues 
surrounding intersexuality, the impact of the intersex activist movement, some 
foreign approaches to intersexuality, and possible U.S. judicial and statutory 
reforms. Within each section, the items are arranged alphabetically by author.
 27. Greenberg, supra note 2. This title is included as it is the sole monograph that focuses on 
the role that legal institutions can play in protecting the rights of people with intersex traits, and it is 
a very highly regarded work.
 28. Much cutting-edge work on the topic of intersexuality is published in nonlegal journals. 
Although I am focusing on law review literature in this article, it is important to note that there are 
excellent articles in, for example, medical journals that delve into legal issues, which researchers 
would be wise to examine.
 29. All the annotated articles resulted from this search, except for one outlier written by one of 
the leading experts on the topic of sex testing and sports policies that ban women athletes for having 
naturally high testosterone. Katrina Karkazis et al., Out of Bounds? A Critique of the New Policies on 
Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female Athletes, Am. J. Bioethics, July 2012, at 3.
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Terminology
Intersex30
¶14 At birth, infants are classified as male or female, usually determined by the 
presentation of their external anatomy. In reality, however, an individual’s sex is a 
combination of bodily characteristics that comprises chromosomes, genitals, hor-
mones, and gonads. If any of these do not fit typical definitions of male or female, 
they can result in additional variations in secondary sexual characteristics such as 
muscle mass, hair distribution, breast development, hip-to-waist ratio, and stat-
ure.31 All of these factors encompass the wide array of variations in sex character-
istics in intersexuality. 
¶15 Medical science has progressed so that we now have a greater understand-
ing of the origins of intersexuality. Genetic male and female embryos are anatomi-
cally identical through the first six to seven weeks of gestation.32 After that, hor-
monal and genetic influences trigger the beginning of development of testes or 
ovaries.33 However, hormonal and genetic occurrences in the womb may cause 
biological variation so that at birth, chromosomes, hormones, gonads, or external 
anatomy do not correspond to the typical male or female. 
¶16 These hormonal and genetic occurrences may cause an intersex individual 
to be born with one of several medical conditions that lead to the individual’s bio-
logical sex being ambiguous. For example, an infant may be born with genitalia 
that have characteristics of both males and females. A female child may be born 
with an unusually large clitoris or without a vaginal opening; a male child may be 
born with a micropenis or with a scrotum that is divided in the formation typical 
of labia. 
¶17 However, not all intersex conditions involve ambiguous genitalia, so they 
may not be immediately identified at birth. Some individuals with intersex traits 
have external genitals of one sex, but the internal anatomy of the other sex. Some 
individuals have the chromosomes of one sex, but the sexual anatomy of the oppo-
site sex. Some may possess male genitals, small testes, and ovaries. Others may have 
atypical chromosomal configurations, such as XXX or XXY or XYY, while some 
may have different chromosomal compositions in different tissues, a condition 
referred to as mosaicism. There is an array of congenital conditions including, 
 30. The term “intersexuality” was coined by Richard Goldschmidt in his 1917 article Intersexual-
ity and the Endocrine Aspect of Sex, 1 Endocrinology 433 (1917). Throughout the accompanying text 
in this annotated bibliography, I use the term “intersex,” and, when referencing individuals, I use the 
term “individuals with intersex traits,” so as to avoid labeling individuals with a term of a biological 
condition. When annotating articles, I use the specific term the author used.
 31. Viloria, supra note 1.
 32. Exploring the Biological Contributions to Human Health: Does Sex Matter? 45 
(Theresa M. Wizemann & Mary-Lou Pardue eds., 2001).
 33. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 4, at 138.
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among others, hypospadias,34 Turner syndrome,35 congenital adrenal hyperplasia,36 
complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS),37 partial androgen insensitivity 
syndrome (PAIS),38 and 5-alpha-reductase deficiency (5-ARD).39 
¶18 Doctors’ assessments about what specific conditions should be classified as 
intersex has been controversial.40 Due to this lack of consensus, and the various 
terms used to refer to intersex, estimates for the prevalence of intersex conditions 
are not exact. Medical experts, however, estimate that when looking at the number 
of infants born with visibly anomalous genitalia that prompts medical investiga-
tion, the average is about 1 in 2000 births, or 0.05% of births.41 However, some 
advocates believe many more people are born with more subtle types of sex varia-
tions than ambiguous genitalia, which are not discovered upon birth, and that they 
constitute 1.7% of births.42 Sometimes intersexuality does not come to light until 
puberty43 or during later stages in development, such as when adults find that they 
 34. Hypospadias is a condition in which individuals with XY chromosomes have the urinary 
opening of the penis located somewhere along the underside of the penis, instead of the tip. The 
severity of hypospadias can vary; sometimes it is such that the penis resembles labia. This can occur 
as an isolated symptom in men with otherwise typical sex development or in conjunction with other 
intersex conditions. Hypospadias, ISNA: Intersex Soc’y of North Am., http://www.isna.org/faq 
/conditions/hypospadias [https://perma.cc/W2WZ-PSFZ]. Although ISNA became defunct in 2008, 
this informative website remains accessible for historical purposes. Dear ISNA Friends and Support-
ers, ISNA: Intersex Soc’y of North Am., http://www.isna.org/ [https://perma.cc/GX27-DYGD].
 35. Turner syndrome is a chromosomal condition in which girls have only one X chromo-
some; female sex characteristics exist but are immature in comparison to the average female. Turner 
Syndrome, ISNA: Intersex Soc’y of North Am., http://www.isna.org/faq/conditions/turner [https://
perma.cc/DL2L-BFKM].
 36. In congenital adrenal hyperplasia, the adrenal glands cannot produce cortisol, causing a large 
production of other hormones that cause virilization. Infants with XX chromosomes may develop 
larger than average clitorises, or even a clitoris that resembles a penis, or labia that appear more like 
a scrotum. Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), ISNA: Intersex Soc’y of North Am., http://www 
.isna.org/faq/conditions/cah [https://perma.cc/7YDM-NC8D].
 37. Complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) is a genetic condition in which, because 
of a receptor defect, the body is unable to process the testosterone produced by the testes, so the 
body develops as female. CAIS individuals have XY chromosomes and a short vagina or none at all. 
External female genitalia form, but no internal female reproductive organs develop. Individuals with 
CAIS have undescended or partially descended testes. Melissa Hines et al., Psychological Outcomes 
and Gender-Related Development in Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, 32 Archives Sexual 
Behav. 93, 93 (2003). Most individuals with CAIS never learn the reason they do not menstruate or 
are unsuccessful in becoming pregnant. Sharon E. Preves, Out of the O.R. and into the Streets: Explor-
ing the Impact of Intersex Media Activism, 12 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 247, 249–50 n.7 (2005).
 38. In contrast, individuals with partial androgen insensitivity syndrome (PAIS) are able to 
partially process testosterone, so their genitals will masculinize to a certain extent. Greenberg, supra 
note 9, at 854 n.6.
 39. An enzyme deficiency, 5-alpha-reductase deficiency (5-ARD) results in XY genetic individuals 
who most often appear to be females when born, but virilize at puberty when testosterone increases. 
What Is 5-Alpha-Reductase Deficiency (5-ARD)?, Accord Alliance, http://www.accordalliance.org 
/faqs/what-is-5-alpha-reductase-deficiency-5-ard/ [https://perma.cc/BW3Y-XGLX]. Children are often 
raised as girls, but usually come to have a male gender identity.
 40. Elisabeth McDonald, Intersex People in Aotearoa New Zealand: The Challenges for Law and 
Social Policy Part I: Critiquing Gender Normalising Surgery, 46 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 705, 
707 (2015).
 41. Hida Viloria, How Common Is Intersex? An Explanation of the Stats., OII-USA, http://oii-usa 
.org/2563/how-common-is-intersex-in-humans/ [https://perma.cc/CEC5-ZPHF].
 42. Id.
 43. For example, if a doctor does not know that an infant who possesses typical female genitals 
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are infertile. Sometimes individuals are determined to have an intersex condition 
only upon autopsy. Others live all their lives with intersex conditions without any-
one knowing it, including themselves.
Disorders/Differences of Sex Development
¶19 A more recent term used to connote intersexuality in the medical commu-
nity is “disorders of sexual development” (DSD). This term is defined by the 2006 
Consensus Statement on Intersex Disorders as “congenital conditions in which 
development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomic sex is atypical.”44 Accord Alli-
ance, an advocacy organization, notes that older terms such as “hermaphrodite” 
and “intersex” are not preferred because the terms are imprecise, and label indi-
viduals, not specific medical conditions.45
¶20 The term “disorder” of sex development is itself a controversial term,46 even 
though it is the most common term used in the medical literature now. Individuals 
with intersex traits, activists, and academics have challenged the use of the term 
“DSD” with its designation as a “disorder,” viewing this as offensive to those who feel 
there is nothing wrong with them and feel stigmatized by the medical connota-
tions.47 An alternative term suggested, which uses the same acronym “DSD,” is “dif-
ferences of sex development.”48 Many individuals with intersex traits still choose to 
embrace the term “intersex,” however, as the term “DSD” simply contributes to 
pathologizing their reality and indicates the need for a medical “cure.”49 
Hermaphrodite50
¶21 Individuals with intersex traits were formerly referred to as “hermaphro-
dites,” an outdated term that is both misleading and stigmatizing,51 although some 
has testes within her abdominal cavity, it will likely not be until puberty that the condition will be 
detected, upon failure to menstruate. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 854.
 44. Lee et al., supra note 18, at e488.
 45. Disorders of Sex Development, Accord Alliance (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.accordalliance 
.org/glossary/disorders-of-sex-development/ [https://perma.cc/8ZKX-TADD]. 
 46. Georgiann Davis, Contesting Intersex: The Dubious Diagnosis 87–89 (2015). 
 47. Ellen K. Feder, Imperatives of Normality: From “Intersex” to “Disorders of Sex Development,” 
15 GLQ: J. Lesbian & Gay Stud. 225, 225–26 (2009). This is ironic in light of the fact that the Intersex 
Society of North America (ISNA), a now defunct organization, originally used the term “DSD” spe-
cifically to support improved medical care for those born with such conditions. Why Is ISNA Using 
“DSD”?, ISNA: Intersex Soc’y of North Am. (May 24, 2006), http://www.isna.org/node/1066 [https://
perma.cc/9KVJ-MDK6].
 48. Milton Diamond & Hazel G. Beh, Changes in the Management of Children with Intersex Con-
ditions, 4 Nature Clinical Prac.: Endocrinology & Metabolism 4, 5 (2008).
 49. Robert Hupf, Allyship to the Intersex Community on Cosmetic, Non-Consensual Genital “Nor-
malizing” Surgery, 22 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 73, 77 (2015); see also interACT Statement on Intersex 
Terminology, interACT, http://interactadvocates.org/interact-statement-on-intersex-terminology/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BHU-X373?type=image].
 50. The term “hermaphrodite” was named after the mythological Greek figure Hermaphroditus, 
“the product of a union between Hermes and Aphrodite.” Jessica L. Adair, In a League of Their Own: 
The Case for Intersex Athletes, 18 Sports Law. J. 121, 124 (2011). 
 51. What Is Useful About the Terminology of DSD? What Is Unhelpful?, Accord Alliance, 
http://www.accordalliance.org/faqs/what-is-useful-about-the-terminology-of-dsd-what-is-unhelpful 
[https://perma.cc/UB8B-5SHF]. In the 1940s, British specialist A.P. Cawadias made the first recom-
mendation to substitute the term “hermaphrodite” with “intersex.” A.P. Cawadias, Hermaphroditos: 
the Human Intersex 6 (1943). 
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use the term as a form of reclamation.52 The term “hermaphrodite” is from mythol-
ogy, conveying that an individual is both thoroughly male and thoroughly female 
(an anatomical impossibility).53 The term has been used to identify those with both 
testicular and ovarian tissue (ovotestes).54 Up until the mid-twentieth century, the 
term “hermaphrodite” was used to refer to all individuals with intersex traits, but 
it is no longer an accurate term as it refers only to a distinct observable gonadal 
anatomy of an individual. The term “intersex” refers to a much more complex array 
of permutations involving both physical appearance and genetic makeup.
Medical Intervention and Its Legal Framework
¶22 Some scholars have suggested litigation as a way to protect, and to achieve 
justice for, infants with intersex traits. This includes the use of the informed con-
sent doctrine, medical malpractice, and constitutional rights. Examining the vari-
ous legal strategies is critical, as individuals with intersex traits who have had their 
rights violated require a legal avenue for effective remedy, including redress and 
compensation. 
Informed Consent
¶23 The informed consent doctrine requires that physicians must disclose all 
pertinent information about medical procedures and the alternatives, including no 
treatment at all, and must ensure that parents understand. However, because many 
intersex conditions are not legitimate medical emergencies, the normalization sur-
geries themselves are not medically necessary and may therefore mislead an inter-
sex infant’s parent(s) into consenting to surgery that would make true, “informed” 
consent absent.55 
Medical Malpractice
¶24 A medical malpractice strategy is another option discussed by scholars. 
However, it may be argued that the doctors followed standard medical practice 
when they performed genital-normalization surgery.56 Because the medical estab-
lishment determines the medical standard of care, proving that a specific standard 
of care is negligent presents many challenges. 
¶25 The medical malpractice strategy may have only a slight possibility of suc-
cess in those jurisdictions that no longer follow the customary practice standard; 
these jurisdictions may assert that the customary practice might itself be negligent, 
and adopt a reasonableness standard instead.57 In those jurisdictions where physi-
cians can no longer be sheltered by the customary practice standard, the trier of 
 52. Hupf, supra note 49, at 78.
 53. Is a Person Who Is Intersex a Hermaphrodite?, ISNA: Intersex Soc’y of North Am., http://
www.isna.org/faq/hermaphrodite [https://perma.cc/EDT6-U6VH].
 54. Adair, supra note 50, at 128.
 55. Liao et al., supra note 16, at 1 (noting that parents are strongly affected by medical advice, 
may not be aware that they are consenting to experimental surgeries, and may experience a high level 
of regret).
 56. Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 2.
 57. Darra L. Clark Hofman, Male, Female, and Other: How Science, Medicine and Law Treat the 
Intersexed, and the Implications for Sex-Dependent Law, 21 Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 1, 14–15 (2012).
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fact must balance the comparative risks of a medical procedure and avoidance of 
the procedure without any expert testimony.58 The trier of fact, of course, is subject 
to the same societal influences regarding gender norms as the doctors who perform 
genital-normalization surgeries, and therefore this medical malpractice strategy 
may not be fruitful.59
Constitutional Rights
¶26 Nonconsensual genital-normalization surgery60 potentially infringes on the 
fundamental rights of a child with intersex traits in various ways. Due to the fact 
that the surgeries cause irreversible damage to intersex children’s physical bodies, 
and often leave them sterile, the fundamental rights to bodily integrity and procre-
ation may be infringed.61 The U.S. Supreme Court should recognize and safeguard 
the individual right to freedom from these damaging and nonessential surgeries. 
Despite these considerations, current U.S. jurisprudence does not sufficiently 
address the many injuries experienced by individuals with intersex traits.62 
¶27 While there has been some success internationally in litigation in this 
area,63 access to reparation in the United States is as yet unknown, as no federal case 
 58. Id. at 15.
 59. Id.
 60. The term “genital-normalization” surgery throughout the text of this article refers to “non-
consensual” genital-normalization surgery, unless otherwise stated.
 61. “The Court’s insistence that the right to control one’s body be protected from undue interfer-
ence by others shows a developed principle of a right to bodily integrity that has evolved from the 
right to privacy.” Joshua C. Albritton, Comment, Intersexed and Injured: How M.C. v. Aaronson Breaks 
Federal Ground in Protecting Intersex Children from Unnecessary Genital-Normalization Surgeries, 24 
Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 163, 173 (2015). The Supreme Court has found the Constitution to fundamen-
tally protect procreational rights. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 62. See Benjamin Sweeney, The Cobblestones of Good Intentions: Substantive Due Process and 
Infant Genital Normalizing Surgery, 13 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 153, 155 (2014).
 63. In Germany, Christiane Völling was the first individual with intersex traits who won an 
award for damages in a lawsuit brought for genital-normalization surgery. In re Völling, (Regional 
Ct. Cologne, Ger.) (Case No. 25 O 179/07, Feb. 6, 2008), http://icj2.wpengine.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2008/02/In-re-Volling-Regional-Court-Cologne-Germany-English.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/V3VN-TXZQ]. Völling was a teenager when she underwent genital surgery. She was born with XX 
chromosomes with ambiguous genitals and was brought up as a boy. When Völling was fourteen years 
old, she required an appendectomy; at that time, surgeons discovered she had two ovaries. Völling had 
never been told that she had XX chromosomes, and when she turned eighteen years of age, she had an 
operation to remove her ovaries. Eventually, Völling identified as a female and, upon investigation, her 
medical records revealed the truth about her diagnosis. Id.; see also Christiane Völling: Hermaphrodite 
Wins Damage Claim over Removal of Reproductive Organs, Zwischengeschlecht.org (Aug. 12, 2009), 
http://zwischengeschlecht.org/pages/Hermaphrodite-wins-damage-claim [https://perma.cc/QAG6 
-9YNB]. The surgeon was ordered to pay €100,000 in damages after a legal battle that began in 2007, 
thirty years after the removal of her reproductive organs. A second successful case in Germany, filed 
by Michaela Raab, was reported in 2015. Seelenlos, Nuremberg Hermaphrodite Lawsuit: Michaela 
“Micha” Raab Wins Damages and Compensation for Intersex Genital Mutilations!, STOP Intersex 
Genital Mutilations in Children’s Clinics! (Dec. 17, 2015), http://stop.genitalmutilation.org/post 
/Nuremberg-Hermaphrodite-Lawsuit-Damages-and-Compensation-for-Intersex-Genital-Mutilations 
[https://perma.cc/9QMQ-XBAP]. Raab sought medical advice as she did not begin to menstruate or 
develop breasts by the time she was twenty years old. Physicians started her on female hormonal treat-
ment and minimized the size of her clitoris. Raab learned years later that she had XY chromosomes, 
information that her physicians had withheld from her. Intersex Person Sues Clinic for Unnecessary Op, 
Local (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.thelocal.de/20150227/intersex-person-sues-doctors-for-unwanted 
-op [https://perma.cc/BB42-WEQV].
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has established injury from genital-normalization surgery. However, in 2013, for 
the first time in the United States, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of an individual 
with intersex traits alleging a violation of constitutional rights because of genital- 
normalization surgery.64 M.C. was born with ambiguous genitals and became a 
ward of the state of South Carolina.65 During this time, the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Social Services held the authority to provide medical care for M.C.66 
¶28 Medical testing determined that M.C. had “ovotesticular DSD,” which is 
characterized by the presence of both ovarian and testicular tissue.67 Although 
there was no medical need for surgery, one of the named defendants, a doctor 
employed by a state university hospital, decided on operations that would assign a 
female sex to M.C., while other named defendant employees of the same hospital 
concluded that M.C. could be raised as a boy or girl, and there was no way to make 
a determination at the time of future gender identity.68 At sixteen months of age, 
M.C.’s surgeons performed “corrective” surgery to remove most of his ambiguous 
phallus, a testis, and testicular tissue on one gonad, and surgically encourage the 
appearance of female genitals.69 These procedures caused M.C. to be sterilized; 
without the surgeries he may have been capable of producing sperm.
¶29 A Columbia, South Carolina, couple, the Crawfords, adopted M.C. after the 
surgery and raised M.C. as a girl according to the sex assignment.70 M.C. grew up 
to self-identify as a male.71 The Crawfords realized the constraints M.C. suffered 
through his genital-normalization surgery and joined with the Southern Poverty 
Law Center (SPLC) and interACT Advocates for Intersex Youth to file suit. They 
brought two complaints—one in federal court72 and one in state court73—against 
the doctors who participated in M.C.’s surgery and the South Carolina Department 
of Social Services and its employees. 
¶30 The federal complaint alleged that M.C.’s substantive due process rights74 of 
procreation, privacy, liberty, and bodily integrity were violated under the Fourteenth 
 64. This was a case of first impression in the United States, as M.C. is the first intersex plain-
tiff to assert constitutional claims in a federal court against a defendant for performing genital- 
normalization surgery. Groundbreaking SPLC Lawsuit Accuses South Carolina, Doctors, and Hospitals 
of Performing Unnecessary Surgery on Infant, Southern Poverty Law Ctr. (May 13, 2013), https://
www.splcenter.org/news/2013/05/14/groundbreaking-splc-lawsuit-accuses-south-carolina-doctors 
-and-hospitals-unnecessary [https://perma.cc/4VR2-U96N].
 65. Complaint at 11–12, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303 (D.S.C. May 14, 2013), 2013 WL 
1961775.
 66. Id. at 11. 
 67. Id. at 12.
 68. Id. at 13–14.
 69. Id. at 15.
 70. The Crawfords had hoped to prevent the unnecessary surgery once they saw M.C.’s profile 
on the State of South Carolina’s child adoption website, but it had already been completed. Id. at 19.
 71. Id.
 72. Id. at 1.
 73. Complaint, M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2013CP400 (S.C. May 14, 
2013), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/case/Crawford_State 
_Complaint_Filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CFU-P4MP].
 74. The SCDSS employees consented to M.C.’s surgery because the child was a ward of the state. 
The substantive due process claim is dependent on a government actor providing consent. If M.C.’s 
biological parents agreed to the surgery before parental rights were terminated, then a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim would not have been a feasible legal strategy. The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not protect against unjust private actions. Sweeney, supra note 62, at 183. 
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Amendment as a result of unnecessary, merely cosmetic genital surgery.75 The com-
plaint also asserted a violation of M.C.’s procedural due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting M.C. to this procedure without a predepriva-
tion hearing to examine whether the procedure was in M.C.’s best interest.76 The case 
was accepted by the federal district court to go to trial, and the court acknowledged 
that M.C. sufficiently alleged both a violation of his substantive due process right to 
procreation77 and his procedural due process right to a pre-deprivation hearing.78 
The district court then rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss and rejected their 
defense of qualified immunity.79 Subsequently, the defendants interlocutorily appealed 
the rejection of this defense. In January 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.80 The 
Fourth Circuit found that M.C.’s asserted rights were not sufficiently clear at the time 
of the operation so as to give officials reasonable fair warning of their violation.81
¶31 M.C.’s state complaint was filed against the Medical University of South 
Carolina (MUSC) and the Greenville Hospital System, alleging medical 
malpractice,82 and the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), 
alleging gross negligence.83 The case against the Greenville Hospital System has 
been settled by the parties.84 While this disposition leaves the law unclear at this 
moment, and may indicate that litigation over such issues might be a difficult path 
for plaintiffs, there is still a pending lawsuit against MUSC and SCDSS. This case is 
likely to be litigated in spring 2017, and the results will be significant. “There is a 
growing community of intersex individuals seeking answers and apologies for the 
medical treatments they received as children,”85 and litigation involving victims of 
intersex infant surgeries is likely to increase.86 
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vation of the individual’s right to self-determination render the genital-normalizing 
surgery unconstitutional. The author concludes by suggesting that the protection of 
fundamental rights for intersex individuals in the United States is near. 
Confines of a Binary System
¶32 While the term “gender” refers to social and cultural differences, and the 
term “sex” refers to an individual’s biological sex,87 the difference between the 
meaning of the terms “sex” and “gender” goes frequently unnoticed in society and 
in official documents. In the annotations of this bibliography, I have used which-
ever term the author uses, “gender” or “sex,” as the two terms are often used inter-
changeably in the legal realm.88
¶33 Over time our society has become more accepting of “gender” as a spec-
trum, where male and female lines blur, but the same cannot be said about “sex.” In 
2014, Facebook initiated the use of many possible terms for people to describe their 
gender; some of these terms are intersex, agender, bigender, pangender, gender-
queer, and androgyne, among others.89 In the same year, the dating website 
OKCupid added new gender options for those individuals who do not fall in the 
 87. Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity in 
APA Documents, https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/DLZ8-4EJ2]. Only in the past few decades have medical and mental health specialists closely 
examined the differences between sex and gender. Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Zoe D. Peterson, 
Distinguishing Between Sex and Gender: History, Current Conceptualizations, and Implications, 64 
Sex Roles 791 (2011).
 88. Julie A. Greenberg, What Do Scalia and Thomas Really Think About Sex? Title VII and Gen-
der Nonconformity Discrimination: Protection for Transsexuals, Intersexuals, Gays and Lesbians, 24 T. 
Jefferson L. Rev. 149, 150 (2002).
 89. Tom McKay, Facebook Just Created 50 New Gender Options for Users to Choose From, 
Mic.com (Feb. 13, 2014), https://mic.com/articles/82241/facebook-just-created-50-new-gender 
-options-for-users-to-choose-from#.S1aVH0Dqy [https://perma.cc/6LWM-E48W].
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binary; these now include agender, adrogynous, bigender, cis man, cis woman, 
genderfluid, genderqueer, hijra, intersex, nonbinary, other, pangender, transfemi-
nine, transgender, transmasculine, transsexual, trans man, trans woman, and two-
spirit.90 Previously, OKCupid allowed users to select only from male, female, 
straight, bisexual, and gay.
¶34 The adoption and use of nonbinary gender classifications by academic 
institutions is another sign of the social evolution. The use of preferred personal 
pronouns in universities and colleges in the United States is gaining traction,91 and 
many provide these preferences to faculty in class rosters. Some of these personal 
pronoun preferences that expand the he/she binary include “xe,” “xyr,” and “xem,”92 
among many other options. 
¶35 Although there has been real progress in challenging traditional gender 
stereotypes and rigid gender norms, and accepting that gender is but a social con-
struct, there is less acceptance that sex itself does not comply with rigid binaries.93 
Our bodies are simply subject to biological variation, but somehow the binary 
perspective of two sexes—male and female—and the pathologizing of deviation 
from this norm is firmly rooted in our society. However, there is some evidence 
that the tide may be turning ever so slowly. In June 2016, a landmark ruling in 
Oregon held that an individual who did not identify as male or female is now 
legally considered nonbinary.94 This ruling in the Circuit Court of the State of 
Oregon, Multnomah County is believed to be the first nonbinary legal classifica-
tion in the United States.95
¶36 Another sign of change can be seen in a decision filed in a 2015 federal 
discrimination lawsuit against the U.S. State Department on behalf of an individual 
with intersex traits, Dana Zzyym.96 Dana was denied a U.S. passport because Dana 
did not choose either male or female on a passport application form; no other gen-
der categories are provided on the form, and Dana does not identify as male or 
 90. Curtis M. Wong, OKCupid Begins Rolling Out New Gender, Sexuality Options, Huffington 
Post (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/17/okcupid-new-gender-options_n 
_6172434.html [https://perma.cc/RQ23-74S3].
 91. Adam Tamburin, Colleges Trend Toward Gender-Neutral Pronouns, USA Today (Sept. 5, 
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/09/05/colleges-trend-toward-gender-neutral 
-pronouns/71780214/ [https://perma.cc/2EW8-PH47?type=image].
 92. The Need for a Gender-Neutral Pronoun, Gender Neutral Pronoun Blog, https://gender 
neutralpronoun.wordpress.com/ [https://perma.cc/4THB-M7ZL].
 93. The same cannot be said in all cultures, some of which include intersex individuals in a “third 
gender” category. See infra annotations following ¶ 41.
 94. In re Sex Change of Jamie Shupe, Case No.: 16CV13991 (June 10, 2016), http://www 
.portlandmercury.com/images/blogimages/2016/06/15/1466024211-shupe_ruling.pdf. 
 95. Christopher Mele, Oregon Court Allows a Person to Choose Neither Sex, N.Y. Times (June 
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/oregon-nonbinary-transgender-sex-gender.html. 
Oregonians currently cannot list a nonbinary classification on a driver’s license, so state officials are 
now working on a process to remove that barrier. Id. A second person has changed sex classifica-
tion from female to nonbinary in 2016. Mary Emily O’Hara, Californian Becomes Second US Citizen 
Granted “Non-Binary” Gender Status, NBC News (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature 
/nbc-out/californian-becomes-second-us-citizen-granted-non-binary-gender-status-n654611 
[https://perma.cc/LF3W-M53U].
 96. The complaint asserts that the U.S. State Department violates the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act. Complaint at 15, 17, 12, 14, Zzyym v. Kerry, No. 1:15-cv-2362 (D. Colo. Oct. 25, 2015), 
2015 WL 6449495.
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female. A federal judge pressed the State Department to issue a gender-neutral 
passport stating, “A lot of things are changing in our world.”97 In November 2016, 
the court found that the administrative record did not provide evidence that the 
Department “followed a rational decisionmaking process in deciding to implement 
its binary-only gender passport policy.”98 The court remanded the case to the U.S. 
State Department “to give it an opportunity either to shore up the record, if it can, 
or reconsider its policy.”99 
¶37 Some scholars theorize that a third sex category would support individuals 
with intersex traits by denouncing the binary system.100 However, many intersex 
activists view these proposals to be outside the “primary” focus of their movement 
to end nonconsensual genital-normalization surgery, and that “until there is a pro-
hibition on the practice . . . , proposals for an alternative solution must take a step 
back.”101 The intersex community advocates that all children should receive a 
binary sex assignment dependent upon the medical condition discovered at birth; 
once the child develops a gender identity, the child may decide to have surgery or 
not, but would be able to consent to this intervention.102 The Council of Europe 
expressed concerns about recognition of third and blank classifications in a 2015 
Issue Paper, stating that these may lead to “forced outings” and cause heightened 
strain on parents of children with intersex traits to select a sex for their child. The 
Issue Paper argues that “further reflection on non-binary legal identification is 
necessary.”103 Some scholars contend that the sex binary system itself validates and 
compels the continued practice of genital-normalization surgery.104 
¶38 Other scholars propose that we not only eliminate sex classifications that 
determine peoples’ rights by opposing the binary system, but also via the eradica-
tion of government-required sex classification on official papers such as birth 
certificates and passports.105 Two of the most cited reasons given for sex classifi-
cation for legal purposes, military combat and marriage, are no longer essential. 
The fact that one’s sex must be noted on every official identifying paper illus-
trates how our society emphasizes the legal significance of this characteristic. 
Some activists state that dispensing with sex and gender classifications from 
 97. Federal Judge Urges US to Grant Gender Neutral Passport, Fox News (July 21, 2016), http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/07/21/federal-judge-urges-us-to-grant-gender-neutral-passport 
.html.
 98. Zzyym v. Kerry, No. 15-CV-02362-RBJ, 2016 WL 7324157 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2016), at 3.
 99. Id.
 100. Hofman, supra note 57, at 19.
 101. Hupf, supra note 49, at 104. 
 102. Consortium on the Mgmt. of Disorders of Sex Dev., Clinical Guidelines for the 
Management of Disorders of Sex Development in Childhood 38 (2006), http://www.dsdguide 
lines.org/files/clinical.pdf [https://perma.cc/S69P-9Y93]. Intersex activists’ recommendations to 
assign a gender to an intersex infant is often based on protecting intersex children and adults, likely 
due to their own experiences of ostracism and distress from sex nonconformity.
 103. Council of Europe, Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights & Intersex People, 
Issue Paper 40 (Apr. 2015), https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet 
.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2933521&SecMode=1&DocId=2367288&Usage=2 [https://perma.cc 
/7KVQ-9U2N].
 104. See Samantha S. Uslan, Note, What Parents Don’t Know: Informed Consent, Marriage, 
and Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Children, 85 Ind. L.J. 301, 304 (2010).
 105. James McGrath, Are You a Boy or a Girl? Show Me Your REAL ID, 9 Nev. L.J. 368, 369–70 
(2009).
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official documents, similarly to race and religion, is a long-term strategic goal for 
the movement.106 
¶39 Various countries have moved to recognize third gender designations, and 
progressive groups have welcomed the laws as a sign of success for intersex rights. 
In 2013, Germany became the first country in Europe to acknowledge a third gen-
der designation: X, for indeterminate or intersex.107 An infant with intersex traits 
will not be required to endure medical intervention when born with ambiguous sex 
characteristics. In that case, an infant will have an “X” marked on the birth certifi-
cate, rather than the rigid categories of M or F. This step allows intersex children to 
decide their gender identity when they reach adulthood, rather than legally or sur-
gically forcing a gender identity upon them without their consent. At the same 
time, the interior ministry declared that German passports would similarly allow a 
third designation, X, for intersex citizens.108 The German third gender designation 
has angered some intersex-rights groups, which object to its stipulation that a child 
who is classified as neither female nor male will be noted in the register of births 
without such assignment.109 The law appears to “necessitate” exclusion from the 
binary classification, so it still leaves judgment to the medical world, not as an 
option for the parents.110
¶40 Other countries issuing passports or national identity cards with an “X,” 
“other,” or “E” (eunuch)111 marker for nonbinary categories include Australia,112 
 106. Morgan Carpenter, The Human Rights of Intersex People: Addressing Harmful Practices 
and Rhetoric of Change, Reproductive Health Matters, May 2016, at 74, 79. 
 107. Michelle Castillo, Germany to Allow Third Gender Designation on Birth Certificates, CBS 
News (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/germany-to-allow-third-gender-designation-on 
-birth-certificates [https://perma.cc/NK7J-ZQS4]. However, the German government emphasizes that 
this “third blank box isn’t an official third gender, or the ‘other’ box—so it doesn’t actually mean that 
there are now three recognized genders in Germany. It’s seen as a temporary solution for very specific 
intersex cases—the children are not expected to live their lives as Xs, but to make a decision to be male 
or female at a non-specified point in the future.” Jacinta Nandi, Germany Got It Right by Offering a 
Third Gender Option on Birth Certificates, Guardian (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2013/nov/10/germany-third-gender-birth-certificate [https://perma.cc/3Z44-3NPF]. 
Germany does not include sex as a category on its ID cards. Miriam Dalli, Male, Female or X: The New 
Gender Options on Identification Documents, Malta Today (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.maltatoday.com 
.mt/news/national/49185/male_female_or_x_the_new_gender_options_on_identification_documents# 
.WEB89lw0-nY [https://perma.cc/YZK7-2KXN].
 108. Castillo, supra note 107.
 109. Nandi, supra note 107.
 110. Sham Package for Intersex: Leaving Sex Entry Open Is Not an Option, OII Europe 
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://oiieurope.org/bluff-package-for-inter-leaving-sex-entry-open-is-not-an-option/ 
[https://perma.cc/54ST-TDCA].
 111. Jennifer Rellis, Please Write “E” In This Box: Toward Self-Identification and Recognition 
of a Third Gender: Approaches in the United States and India, 14 Mich. J. Gender & L. 223, 233 (2008).
 112. Christopher Zara, Intersex Australia: Third Gender Allowed on Personal Documents 
in Addition to Male and Female, Int’l Bus. Times (June 14, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/intersex 
-australia-third-gender-allowed-personal-documents-addition-male-female-1307843 [https://perma 
.cc/6VYU-9HS7].
240 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 109:2  [2017-12]
Bangladesh,113 Colombia,114 Denmark,115 India,116 Malta,117 Nepal,118 New Zealand,119 
and Pakistan.120 These are examples of jurisdictions using a tool other than the 
judiciary to recognize intersex or otherwise gender-variant individuals. 
¶41 Intersex activists’ paramount goal and efforts are to see a moratorium on 
nonconsensual genital-normalization surgery, not to first champion a movement 
to reform the binary sex classification system. Banning nonconsensual genital-
normalization surgery would be a breakthrough in intersex rights, and, once this 
issue is resolved, we should see more focus on support for the termination of our 
preoccupation with the male/female sex binary. 
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ments that reveal the complexity of sex. Reliance on the binary results in the legal 
exclusion of those who do not fit neatly within the categories, such as intersexed 
individuals. Hofman explores a number of possible solutions to this issue, but 
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This author’s proposal is crystal clear: “[W]e must cease using the Birth 
Certificate to assign sex to a child” (p.308). Reilly illuminates three distinct rea-
sons why assigning sex at birth is problematic: (1) an individual’s sexual identity 
is not determinable at birth, nor is it unchanging; (2) the medium on which the 
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sexual diversity in the law has created a legal uncertainty for transgender and 
intersex individuals, and has further marginalized both groups. This author 
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Discrimination
Discrimination Generally
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and address such discrimination through relevant anti-discrimination initiatives.”122
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called into question; it may be conjectured that the athlete possesses a distinct edge 
in a competition as a result of sex characteristics. It is possible in some instances 
that the athlete is intersex.
¶44 Sex verification was initiated at the Olympics in 1968 with confirmation by 
physical examination; verification was later made using chromosome testing. This 
issue presented many problems for intersex athletes, as there are females who pos-
sess XY chromosomes (such as individuals with CAIS or PAIS) and males who 
possess XX chromosomes.124 Additionally, there are genes on chromosomes other 
than the X or Y that also affect sex development. Simply determining whether an 
athlete has XX or XY or some other variation will not determine definitively the 
individual’s sex. 
 123. For example, Santhi Soundarajan, an Indian athlete who competed in the 800-meter 
race at the 2006 Asian Games, was forced to return her silver medal when she did not pass a sex veri-
fication test because she had androgen insensitivity syndrome. Other athletes’ sex is questioned after 
death, such as happened to Stanisława Walasiewicz. Daniel Gandert et al., The Intersection of Women’s 
Olympic Sport and Intersex Athletes: A Long and Winding Road, 46 Ind. L. Rev. 387, 395–96 (2013).
 124. This condition occurs when a gene of the Y chromosome resides on an X chromosome, 
which results in the X chromosome operating more like a Y chromosome. 
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¶45 These problems with chromosomal sex verification became apparent to the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1996, when they confronted difficult 
decisions with the results of sex testing. Seven of the eight women who were found 
to have male chromosomes had androgen insensitivity syndrome,125 and, thus, were 
unable to use the testosterone they made. It is worth remembering that most of us 
know whether we are men or women even though we have no idea what our “sex 
chromosomes” are. Gender identity is about who you know yourself to be, not 
about how your sex chromosomes look on a microscope slide. Doctors look at the 
“sex chromosomes” of people with DSD as part of coming up with a diagnosis, but 
they do not treat the “sex chromosomes” alone as a simple answer to anything. Our 
“sex chromosomes” are just part of the picture of who we are.
¶46 Therefore, in 1999, since it was impossible to identify an athlete as com-
pletely male or female, the IOC eliminated “compulsory” sex verification. However, 
the IOC and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) reserved 
the right to test an athlete’s chromosomes if uncertainty about her sex emerged and 
to require a hormonal test, a gynecological exam, and a psychological assessment. 
¶47 The IAAF, in 2011, instituted testing for hyperandrogenism126 in women 
athletes, due in large part to the Caster Semenya controversy.127 Testing is done 
when there are reasonable grounds for believing that a woman has the condition. A 
female athlete who possesses testosterone levels within the male range is prohibited 
from competition, unless either she is insensitive to testosterone or she decreases 
her testosterone.
¶48 Similarly, IOC officials instituted testosterone level testing for the 2012 
Olympic Games. The testing is not used for “all” athletes in women’s competitions; 
this testing is done only when requested by the chief medical officer of a national 
Olympic committee or by a member of the IOC’s medical commission when an 
individual’s sex identification is called into question. Female athletes are barred 
from women’s events if testing shows testosterone levels in the normal range for 
males.128 Those athletes with CAIS are permitted to participate in the games.
 125. J.C. Reeser, Gender Identity and Sport: Is the Playing Field Level?, 39 Brit. J. Sports Med. 
695, 696 (2005).
 126. Hyperandrogenism is a condition in which the body produces higher than normal lev-
els of hormones called androgens, particularly testosterone. Joanna Marchant, Women with High Male 
Hormone Levels Face Sport Ban, Nature (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110414 
/full/news.2011.237.html.
 127. Caster Semenya is a South African runner. She won gold at the World Championships 
in 2009 in the women’s 800-meter race. Due to her appearance, she was subjected to gender verifica-
tion testing by the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). The results were not 
released, but unconfirmed reports claim that although physically appearing to be a woman, she has 
internal testicles and does not have a uterus or ovaries. Ariel Levy, Either/Or, New Yorker, Nov. 30, 
2009, at 46, 48–49. Semenya was suspended for nearly a year by the IAFF before being cleared to run 
in 2010. Runner Wins Three Titles in Four Hours, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2016, at SP6. 
 128. This IOC policy is discriminatory on its face because there are no guidelines on what 
is an acceptable level of testosterone for men competing in men’s events. For example, the intersex 
condition Diplo (XYY) causes higher levels of testosterone than in nonintersex men, yet the IOC 
policy does not ban men with Diplo from events, and these men could also be seen as having an unfair 
physical advantage. Kathryn E. Henne, Testing for Athlete Citizenship: Regulating Dope and Sex 
in Sport 91 (2015).
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¶49 Scholars have criticized hyperandrogenism testing in female athletes, stat-
ing that it is significantly flawed.129 There are privacy concerns the athletes will 
face. The testing means that many women athletes will face mandatory, but unnec-
essary, hormonal therapy, or have undescended testes surgically removed, if they 
want to continue to participate in competition. It is likely that “sex policing” will 
become more rampant. Recommendations have been made that athletes be allowed 
to participate in accordance with their legal sex130 or their gender identity.131
¶50 In 2014, the British Medical Journal reported on a study of four young 
female athletes with 5-ARD who had gonadectomy and partial clitoridectomy 
procedures to participate in athletics after testing showed elevated androgen lev-
els.132 The study maintains that this invasive and irreversible medical interven-
tion was not medically necessary and undermines ethical care. All four athletes 
reside in developing countries where they may likely have difficulty with receiv-
ing lifetime hormone replacement therapy. The OIC and IAAF testosterone-
based eligibility policies that mandate intervention conflict with the medical 
approach to hyperandrogenism, which considers the athlete’s health, symptoms, 
and fertility goal.
¶51 In July 2015, the International Court of Arbitration of Sport, the ultimate 
arbiter for conflict in sports, ruled that the IAAF’s policy regarding natural testos-
terone is not supported by current scientific research.133 The court acknowledged 
that while natural testosterone may impact competitive advantage, exactly what 
that impact is, and how significant it is, is unclear at this time. The court declared 
that 
while the evidence indicates that higher levels of naturally occurring testosterone may 
increase athletic performance, [the court] is not satisfied that the degree of that advantage is 
more significant than the advantage derived from the numerous other variables which the 
parties acknowledge also affect female athletic performance: for example, nutrition, access 
to specialist training facilities and coaching, and other genetic and biological variations.134 
¶52 Thus, the court found that mandating medical intervention for participa-
tion in sports was indefensibly discriminatory and suspended the IAAF’s testoster-
one policy. The court provided the IAAF time to substantiate the claim that natu-
rally high testosterone in females is equivalent to men’s advantage in sports. If such 
proof does not materialize by July 2017, the testosterone policy will be declared 
void.135
 129. See generally Karkazis et al., supra note 29, at 3.
 130. Hida Viloria, Article: Hida Speaks About Her Involvement with the IOC in the Global 
Herald, HidaViloria (Apr. 11, 2011) http://hidaviloria.com/hida-speaks-about-here-involvement 
-with-the-ioc-in-the-global-herald/.
 131. Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 31 Wis. 
J.L. Gender & Soc’y 29, 50 (2016).
 132. Rebecca Jordan-Young et al., Sex, Health, and Athletes, 348 BMJ 20 (May 10, 2014).
 133. Chand v. Athletics Fed’n of India (AFI), CAS 2014/A/3759, http://www.tas-cas.org/file 
admin/user_upload/AWARD_3759__FINAL___REDACTED_FOR_PUBLICATION_.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/EHM7-7L3E]; see also Ruth Padawer, Too Fast to Be Female, N.Y. Times (Mag.), July 3, 2016, 
at MM32.
 134. Chand v. Athletics Fed’n of India (AFI), CAS 2014/A/3759.
 135. Id.
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¶53 Although the IOC relied upon the same science in its testosterone policy, it 
did not immediately suspend its policy, as the IAFF was compelled to do. In Febru-
ary 2016, the IOC did agree that it would not police women’s natural testosterone 
levels until the controversy is settled.136 The IOC encouraged the IAAF to substanti-
ate its claim before the policy could be declared void, so that the IOC could reinsti-
tute their policy.137
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¶54 Numerous local, national, and international human rights institutions; 
health institutions; national ethics bodies; and civil society organizations have 
been closely scrutinizing medical practices and discrimination faced by individ-
uals with intersex traits. Generally, these organizations advocate for an end to 
nonconsensual genital “normalizing” interventions, viewing them as human 
rights abuses.138 Research in the field of human rights acknowledges an increas-
ing consensus that there is a wide array of biological variation in the human 
 138. Many of these organizations have published investigations and reports on the human 
rights of intersex people. For example, the Human Rights Commission of San Francisco published 
one of the first human rights reports on the treatment of intersex individuals. City & Cty. of S.F. 
Human Rts. Comm’n, A Human Rights Investigation into the Medical “Normalization” of 
Intersex People 17 (Apr. 2005) (concluding that genital-normalization surgeries performed without 
an individual’s informed consent are inherent human rights violations).
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body, even if some of these are uncommon.139 Because their bodies are viewed as 
different, children and adults with intersex traits are often stigmatized and sub-
jected to multiple human rights violations. In addition to discrimination and 
unequal treatment, these areas of concern include infringement of the right to 
health and physical integrity, the right to be free from torture and ill-treatment,140 
and the right to procreate.141 
¶55 In 2013, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan Mendez, reported that genital- 
normalization surgery was an abuse in medical care that crosses a threshold of 
mistreatment commensurate with torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, and disguised as forms of reparative therapies.142 The report 
calls for all states to “repeal any law allowing intrusive and irreversible treatments, 
including forced genital-normalizing surgery . . . when enforced or administered 
without the free and informed consent of the person concerned.”143
¶56 The World Health Organization (WHO) joined with other U.N. organiza-
tions in 2014 to condemn the forced sterilization of persons with intersex traits, 
stating that “if possible, irreversible invasive medical interventions should be post-
poned until a child is sufficiently mature to make an informed decision, so that they 
can participate in decision-making and give full, free and informed consent.”144 
¶57 The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
in 2015 recognized genital-normalization surgery as an irreversible, unnecessary 
intervention to enforce the sex binary, which can result in “severe, long-term physi-
cal and psychological suffering.”145
¶58 During 2015, the Council of Europe,146 the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights,147 and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights148 
 139. Pediatric Gender Assignment: A Critical Reappraisal 155–56 (Stephen Zderic et al. 
eds., 2002).
 140. For example, when a surgeon surgically creates a vagina, children must suffer through 
regular procedures on a lifetime basis where dilators must be inserted to maintain the vaginal structure. 
This has been described as a “routine sexual invasion.” Irene Habich, Boy, Girl, Other: Intersex Advo-
cates Call for Surgery Ban, Spiegel Online Int’l (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international 
/germany/intersex-activists-call-for-ban-on-surgical-operations-on-children-a-931213.html [https://
perma.cc/97XF-JRE8].
 141. Many, but “[n]ot all children with intersex conditions are sterilized. Some are born 
infertile, and some retain fertility after medical treatment.” Anne Tamar-Mattis, Sterilization and 
Minors with Intersex Conditions in California Law, 3 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 126, 129 (2012).
 142. Juan E. Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53 
_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCU6-NR8F].
 143. Id. ¶ 88.
 144. World Health Org., Eliminating Forced, Coercive and Otherwise Involun-
tary Sterilization: An Interagency Statement 7–8 (2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream 
/10665/112848/1/9789241507325_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSC4-7FCL]. 
 145. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts., Discrimination and Violence Against 
Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ¶ 53 (May 4, 2015).
 146. Council of Europe, supra note 103, at 19.
 147. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rts., The Fundamental Rights Situ-
ation of Intersex People (Apr. 2015), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2015-focus-04 
-intersex.pdf [https://perma.cc/NEA8-3A3K].
 148. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Violencia Contra Personas 
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also each called for a review of the unnecessary medicalization of intersex traits, 
which interfere with the individual’s right to health, noting many of the human 
rights issues intersex people confront—forced sterilization; pain; incontinence; loss 
of sexual sensation; and lifelong mental suffering, including depression. Recogniz-
ing the adverse effect on physical integrity and autonomy, the recommendation 
was to cease genital-normalization surgery without the consent of the affected 
person.
¶59 In the same year, 2015, the Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice estab-
lished the first Intersex Human Rights Fund supporting organizations, projects, 
and campaigns led by intersex activists working worldwide to ensure the human 
rights, bodily autonomy, physical integrity, and self-determination of people with 
intersex traits.149
¶60 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in 2016, also 
expressed concern over the treatment of intersex people, considering bodily integ-
rity, autonomy, freedom, and security of the individual related to nonconsensual, 
medically unnecessary treatment of intersex infants, children, and adolescents.150
¶61 The Asia Pacific Forum on National Human Rights Institutions, in its 2016 
report, discussed the rights to physical integrity, nondiscrimination, recognition 
before the law, and effective remedies and redress.151
¶62 German and Swiss ethics institutions have also reported on this issue. A 
Swiss National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics report argues against 
genital-normalization surgery due to the effect on physical and psychological 
integrity, and advocates for the delivery of better psychosocial support.152 The 
Swiss report advocates that all “(non-trivial) sex assignment treatment decisions 
which have irreversible consequences but can be deferred should not be taken until 
the person to be treated can decide for him/herself.”153 The report also suggests that 
questions of criminal sanctions for sex assignment interventions should be 
examined. 
¶63 The German Ethics Council reported that intersex people should be recog-
nized, supported, and protected from discrimination.154 Noting the importance of 
the right to physical integrity, preservation of sexual and gender identity, and right 
Lesbianas, Gay, Bisexuales, Trans e Intersex en América (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.oas.org/es 
/cidh/informes/pdfs/ViolenciaPersonasLGBTI.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MWT-G4FT].
 149. Introducing the Intersex Fund Team at Astraea!, Astraea Lesbian Found. for Just. 
(June 16, 2015), http://www.astraeafoundation.org/news/344/60/Introducing-the-Intersex-Fund 
-team-at-Astraea [https://perma.cc/J9WH-SHC7].
 150. African Comm’n on Human & People’s Rts., Report on the Civil, Political and 
Socio-Economic Rights of Transgender and Intersex Persons in South Africa Under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Response to the Second Combined Periodic 
Report of the Government of South Africa and the Initial Report Under the Protocol to 
the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (Apr. 2016), http://genderdynamix.org 
.za/wp-content/uploads/ACHPR-Transgender-and-Intersex-Shadow-Report-April-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QFU6-YPWX].
 151. Promoting and Protecting Human Rights in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender 
Identity and Sex Characteristics, APF: Asia Pac. F. of Nat’l Human Rts. Insts. (June 2016), http://www 
.asiapacificforum.net/resources/manual-sogi-and-sex-charactersitics/.
 152. Swiss Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Biomedical Ethics, supra note 15, at 1.
 153. Id. at 18.
 154. German Ethics Council, Intersexuality: Opinion 125 (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www 
.ethikrat.org/files/opinion-intersexuality.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2FW-HE9B].
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to an open future and procreative freedom, the German Ethics Council recom-
mended that irreversible medical sex assignment in persons of ambiguous gender 
should be taken only by the individual concerned; in the case of a minor, the Ethics 
Council stated that 
[i]n the case of an affected individual who has not yet attained decision-making capacity, 
such measures should be adopted only after thorough consideration of all their advantages, 
disadvantages and long-term consequences and for irrefutable reasons of child welfare. 
Such a reason at any rate applies if the measure concerned serves to avert a grave concrete 
risk to the life or physical health of the affected individual.155 
¶64 While these various reports and recommendations are all positive steps 
for the human rights of individuals with intersex traits, it is the enactment, 
codification, and administration of human rights protections that is vital in each 
country’s judicial opinions, statutes, and regulations. This process has been more 
measured.156 
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 157. Accord Alliance (http://www.accordalliance.org/) took the place of the Intersex Soci-
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In 2007, ISNA sponsored and convened a national group of health care and advocacy professionals 
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care and outcomes.
Dear ISNA Friends and Supporters, supra note 34. 
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intersex youth. It was formerly known as Advocates for Informed Choice.
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¶67 Intersex activists argue that while psychosocial reasons are often the reason 
given to perform genital-normalization surgery, this type of treatment is socially 
driven and, therefore, ethically questionable. When surgery and hormone treat-
ments are considered, healthcare professionals must ask themselves whether they 
are truly needed for the benefit of the child or are being offered to allay parental 
distress.161 
¶68 Intersex activists have worked tirelessly to educate society about these 
issues. They have publicized their stories via mass media, reaching many people; 
they have also connected with the healthcare industry by working with researchers, 
presenting at medical conferences, and reaching out to medical students.162 While 
it may appear that this work will succeed and one day eradicate, or at least limit, 
nonconsensual genital “normalizing” surgeries, the formation of new standards of 
care take a long time to impact actual medical practices.163 This slow evolution is 
taking too much time for much of the intersex community, who desire an immedi-
ate ban on genital-normalization surgery. This position is shared by many legal 
scholars.164
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Preves identifies ISNA as one of the pioneers of the intersex movement, highlight-
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activist group. Preves credits ISNA and its use of mass media as a tool for advanc-
ing their political platform for the increased awareness of intersex issues. Preves 
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admits that this recognition is not without controversy, foreshadowing the move-
ment’s tensions over where discourse of the intersex people belongs. 
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This article is borne out of the author’s personal experience as an ally working 
on behalf of intersex people. Stone maintains that the current tightrope that allies 
must walk—advocating for the interests of the group and gathering emotional 
information regarding injustices, while recognizing the limitations of personally 
understanding an individual’s struggles—requires a careful balancing of attitudes 
and behaviors to facilitate effective advocacy. Since intersex people are only a 
small percentage of the population, Stone argues that allies will be crucial to the 
intersex movement.
Intersection with Other Movements: LGBT and Same-Sex Marriage
¶69 The general public has been made more aware of the variations of gender 
and sexual orientation due to the LGBT and same-sex marriage movements. With 
the increased openness about sexual orientation and the growing visibility of the 
LGBT community and their challenge to expectations about gender roles and iden-
tity, there has been increasing social acceptance for individuals who do not fit the 
traditional classifications of gender and sexuality. This awareness that sexual 
anatomy does not dictate an individual’s gender identity or sexual orientation has 
benefited the intersex movement’s progress. “[T]ransgender165 identity [is] far less 
of a story than it used to be,”166 while intersexuality is now the more marginal clas-
sification, in need of increased public awareness. 
¶70 However, the transgender community and the intersex community some-
times have disparate objectives. The intersex community’s focus is not about mak-
ing decisions on whether to have surgical intervention to “normalize” their bodies 
to their correct gender; the concern is about decisions regarding their biology 
being made with a lack of consent on their part.167 This has created some worries 
among the intersex community about the development of LGBT groups that 
include an “I” for the inclusion of persons with intersex traits. Other concerns are 
that including the “I” would encourage the public to assume that individuals with 
intersex traits should automatically be considered lesbian, gay, bisexual, or trans-
gender.168 Some fear that parents of intersex infants who might reach out for assis-
tance and education would not do so with an LGBT group, and might even be more 
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erties, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 51, 51 (2006) (“Transsex individuals often desire the future body that 
they should have, while intersex individuals often mourn the body they had before an unwarranted 
normalizing surgery interfered with it.”).
 168. Intersex individuals, like all people, have various sexual orientations and gender iden-
tities. Paulo Sampaio Furtado et al., Gender Dysphoria Associated with Disorders of Sex Development, 
9 Nat’l Rev. Urology 620, 622 (2012). Furtado states that between 8.5% and 20% of individuals with 
intersex traits may realize gender dysphoria due to their sex assignment at birth; this figure is depen-
dent on the type of DSD. Id. at 626.
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likely to advocate for genital normalization for their children out of fear about their 
later sexuality or gender identity.169 Intersex activists are also concerned that their 
identity would be lost if joined with the larger LGBT movement, and believe that it 
is critical that the intersex movement gain visibility and provide specific resources 
for their own community.170 
¶71 Despite divergent paths, the transgender movement and the intersex move-
ment do intersect in some ways. In both movements, individuals find their bodies 
are pathologized in a way analogous to the way psychiatry viewed homosexuality 
decades ago. Transgender individuals may still find themselves categorized as hav-
ing a “gender identity disorder.” From this perspective, intersexuality is simply a 
different sexual minority that is considered “abnormal” and is pathologized.171
¶72 Another similarity in both movements is that surgical intervention for 
intersexuality is prompted by prejudice, discrimination, and fear of homosexuality. 
Our society’s healthcare system determines the functionality of male and female 
genitals by the ability to engage in heterosexual intercourse.172 The fact of the mat-
ter is that the LGBT movement, same-sex marriage movement, and other social 
movements have all helped spur on the intersex movement. Social change requires 
evolution, and whatever the sequence, it is clear that diverse expressions of gender 
and sexuality are becoming more accepted and mainstream.
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classified as a woman or a man. The single-factor approach, Rosin argues, is not 
always decisive and can have unintended legal consequences. The author argues 
that sex is analogous to race and is thus a social construct that cannot be confined 
to clear-cut categories. Rosin advances the concept of “‘universal marriage,’ the 
right of any two unmarried (not closely related) adult persons to marry each other 
and enjoy the legal benefits (and obligations) of marriage regardless of the genital 
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Foreign Approaches to Intersex Rights
Discrimination
¶73 Individuals with intersex traits are frequently stigmatized and suffer a vari-
ety of human rights abuses. The international community has been working effec-
tively to change standards on an international level. Presently, four countries pro-
tect “intersex” people from discrimination: South Africa, Australia, the island of 
Jersey, and the United States (on a very limited basis); three other countries protect 
such discrimination on the grounds of “sex characteristics”: Malta, Greece, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
¶74 In South Africa, which expressly protects against sex discrimination in its 
constitution, the Judicial Matters Amendment Act, 2005 amended the Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Act 4 of 2000) to 
incorporate intersex within its definition of sex.173 The Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act begins with a schedule of definitions, and 
two new definitions were added: (1) “sex” includes “intersex,” and (2) “intersex 
means a congenital sexual differentiation which is atypical, to whatever degree.” 
This change made intersex part of the meaning of “sex” in the equality clause, thus 
protecting intersexual individuals from discrimination. 
¶75 In Australia, “intersex status” was added in 2013 as a protected biological 
attribute in the Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Iden-
tity and Intersex Status) Act on August 1, 2013, differentiating intersex status from 
sexual orientation, gender identity, and sex.174 This legislation protects intersex 
individuals as a stand-alone prohibited ground of discrimination.175 Similarly, the 
island of Jersey added “intersex status” to its definition of sex in 2015.176 Since dis-
crimination on the basis of sex is prohibited, intersex status is protected in Jersey.
 173. Judicial Matters Amendment Act 22 of 2005 § 16.
 174. Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex 
Status) Act 2013, (Cth) s 4(1).
 175. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., supra note 122.
 176. States of Jersey (2015), Discrimination (Sex and Related Characteristics) (Jersey) Reg-
ulations 201, sched. 1, para. 7.3; see also Dan Christian Ghattas, Standing Up for the Rights of 
Intersex People 15 (Dec. 2015), http://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/how_to_be_a_great 
_intersex_ally_a_toolkit_for_ngos_and_decision_makers_december_2015_updated.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7ZSJ-XBL5].
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¶76 The United States issued a much narrower protection when the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services provided a response to a comment 
clarifying section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act.177 This response stated that 
when dealing with health programs administered by the Department of Health and 
Human Services, “the prohibition on sex discrimination extends to discrimination 
on the basis of intersex traits or atypical sex characteristics.”178
¶77 In 2015, Malta adopted the Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex 
Characteristics (GIGESC) Act that protects intersex individuals from discrimina-
tion on grounds of “sex characteristics.”179 The Maltese act states that “public ser-
vice has the duty to ensure that unlawful sexual orientation, gender identity, gender 
expression and sex characteristics discrimination and harassment are eliminated, 
whilst its services must promote equality of opportunity to all, irrespective of sex-
ual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics.”180
¶78 The GIGESC Act was a landmark piece of legislation in Europe.181 Greece182 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina183 also categorize “sex characteristics” as a prohibited 
basis of discrimination. 
Genital Surgery Practices
¶79 Colombia and Malta have legally addressed the practice of nonconsensual 
genital surgery. The United States currently has a pending court case that addresses 
this issue and will likely be litigated in 2017.184
¶80 The Constitutional Court in Colombia addressed this issue judicially by 
considering consent standards for such surgery with the country’s constitution and 
 177. InterACT, Federal Government Bans Discrimination Against Intersex People in Health 
Care, InterAct Blog (May 23, 2016), http://interactadvocates.org/federal-government-bans 
-discrimination-against-intersex-people-in-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/L6FZ-3C7L].
 178. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31389 (May 18, 
2016).
 179. Individuals with intersex traits are covered under the language of “sex characteristics” 
because “[i]ntersex people are born with sex characteristics (including genitals, gonads and chromo-
some patterns) that do not fit typical binary notions of male or female bodies.” Gender Identity, 
Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act of 2015, No. XI. This act also acknowledges a right to 
bodily integrity and physical autonomy; U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., supra note 
122; see also infra “Genital Surgery Practices,” ¶¶ 79–83. 
 180. Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act of 2015 ¶ 2.
 181. Malta Adopts Ground-Breaking Trans and Intersex Law, TGEU: Transgender Europe 
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://tgeu.org/malta-adopts-ground-breaking-trans-intersex-law/ [https://perma 
.cc/9DAC-P5UG].
 182. ILGA-Europe, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe 12 (May 2016), http://www.ilga-europe.org/sites 
/default/files/Attachments/annual_review_2016-for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8XB-DP4U]; see 
also Ghattas, supra note 176, at 15.
 183. ILGA-Europe, supra note 182, at 49; see also Anti-Discrimination Law Updated—
Great Step Forward in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ILGA Europe (July 14, 2016), http://ilga-europe.org 
/resources/news/latest-news/anti-discrimination-law-updated-bosnia-herzegovina [https://perma 
.cc/TG9S-ZKBP]; Bosnia & Herzegovina Amends Its Anti-Discrimination Law; Intersex People Offered 
Protection for the First Time, Equal Rts. Ass’n for W. Balkans & Turk. (July 14, 2016), http://www 
.lgbti-era.org/latest-news/bosnia-herzegovina-amends-its-anti-discrimination-law-intersex-people 
-offered-protection-for-the-first-time [https://perma.cc/J7GB-F5MB].
 184. See supra “Medical Intervention and Its Legal Framework—Constitutional Rights,” 
¶¶ 26–31.
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international norms in mind.185 Originally, the court declared that genital surgery 
was an infringement on one’s fundamental right to human dignity and gender iden-
tity, and it demanded that the patient him- or herself must provide the informed 
consent.186 In two later cases,187 the court’s holding was narrowed, allowing 
informed written parental consent for children younger than five years old, if the 
doctors provided parents with detailed information about the risks and benefits of 
surgery, and time to deliberate.188 Even though the final holding does not safeguard 
the rights of the youngest citizens, the controversy was acknowledged, and a height-
ened level of consent was required by the court.189
¶81 In 2015, Malta became the first country to legislatively prohibit medically 
unnecessary genital surgery and treatment on the sex characteristics of minors 
without their informed consent, strengthening the rights of intersex persons.190 The 
legislation acknowledges a right to bodily integrity and physical autonomy, and 
directly bans surgical intervention driven by social factors. The Maltese Parliament 
advises other states to reassess and reform their legislation similarly.
¶82 Other countries and government entities have recognized the issues at stake 
but not taken any formal legal action, as can be seen in the government findings of 
Australia, Kenya, Chile, Argentina, and the United States. The Australian Senate, in 
2013, issued a report recommending that genital-normalization surgery be deferred 
until the individual can give his or her own fully informed consent.191 A Kenyan 
court, in 2014, found that medical intervention on intersex infants should face 
regulation, but then punted the issue to Parliament, stating that Parliament was the 
proper body to administer these regulations.192 Chile’s Ministry of Health193 and 
 185. Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 Am. J.L. & Med. 41, 50 (2004). 
Colombian law provides much more protection for intersex children than current U.S. law. The 
Colombia Constitutional Court relied on the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, one of 
the primary authorities used to challenge nonconsensual genital-normalization surgery. The United 
States has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 66.
 186. Id. at 49–55. In that case, in 1995, the “court ruled that doctors could not alter the 
gender of a patient, regardless of the patient’s age, without the patient’s own informed consent.” Id. at 
50. 
 187. Julie A. Greenberg & Cheryl Chase, Colombia’s Highest Court Restricts Surgery on 
Intersex Children, Intersex Soc’y of N. Am., http://www.isna.org/colombia/background.html [https://
perma.cc/VP78-XDH4] (synthesizing in English the three Colombian cases). 
 188. The court called for the institution of what could be called “exceptional informed con-
sent” before the performance of sex-assignment surgery. Hofman, supra note 57, at 13–14. 
 189. Haas, supra note 185, at 54.
 190. Kieran Guilbert, Surgery and Sterilization Scrapped in Malta’s Benchmark LGBTI Law, Reuters.
com (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gay-rights-malta-idUSKBN0MS4ZE20150401 [https://
perma.cc/LXM4-AMAS]; see also Malta Adopts Ground-Breaking Trans and Intersex Law, supra note 181.
 191. Senate Community Affairs References Comm., Involuntary or Coerced Ster-
ilization of Intersex People in Australia (Oct. 25, 2013) (Austl.), http://www.aph.gov.au 
/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Involuntary_Sterilisation/Sec 
_Report/index [https://perma.cc/3BMJ-YSAT].
 192. Baby “A” v. Atty. Gen., Kenyatta Nat’l Hosp., Petition No. 266 (H.C.K. 2013), http://
kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/104234/ [https://perma.cc/T2CR-TAGV]. 
 193. Instruye Sobre Ciertos Aspectos de la Atencion de Salud a Ninos y Ninas Intersex, Cir-
cular No. 18 (Dec. 22, 2015), https://oii.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Circular-08-22.12.15 
-Instruye-Sobre-Ciertos-Aspectos-de-la-atencion-de-Salud-a-Ninos-y-Ninas-Intersex.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T7DL-ZKMR]; see also Michael K. Lavers, Chilean Officials Oppose Intersex Children 
“Normalization” Surgery, Wash. Blade (Jan. 11, 2016), http://washingtonblade.com/2016/01/11 
/chilean-officials-oppose-normalization-surgery-for-intersex-children/ [https://perma.cc/VJ7S-UUZF].
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Argentina’s National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism194 
(a government agency) acted in a similar fashion after examination of this matter. 
¶83 Most recently, the U.S. Department of State, on October 26, 2016, issued a 
statement on Intersex Awareness Day, noting that intersex individuals “routinely 
face forced medical surgeries that are conducted at a young age without free or 
informed consent. These interventions jeopardize their physical integrity and abil-
ity to live free.”195 While the recommendations, reports, and statements above do 
not involve legal action or legislation, they do help to spread awareness of the 
human rights issues involved and show leadership while many individuals with 
intersex traits await stronger protections.
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U.S. Reform/Recommendations
¶84 Some scholars have proposed mandatory judicial oversight whenever par-
ents pursue genital-normalization surgery for their child.196 This would assure the 
best interest of the child is the exclusive focus of a neutral decision maker, provid-
ing sufficient procedural and substantive due process protections.197 Another pro-
posal is that a two-step approach be instituted that would necessitate guidance 
from an ethics board (including psychiatrists, pediatricians, and other relevant 
experts) and a recommendation by the court prior to any surgery.198 In her pro-
posal, Julie Greenberg suggests that the board would provide an advisory opinion 
to the court, and the court would make the final determination.199 Greenberg’s 
proposal also includes that a child advocate be appointed by the court to advocate 
for the child’s interests.200 In the face of the above judicial oversight proposals, par-
ents may argue that the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges parents have a protected 
liberty interest in the way they raise their children under the Fourteenth 
Amendment;201 however, this right has been found to have its limitations.202
¶85 It is also possible that hospitals and physicians may take action to advocate 
for court review before performing genital-normalization surgeries, as they start to 
be aware of the increasing possibility of litigation by former patients who are dis-
satisfied with their surgery results.203 The criticisms of immediate surgery on 
infants have been made known more broadly, and, over time, it is becoming 
increasingly uncertain exactly what risks physicians are required to acknowledge to 
conform to the standard for informed consent.204
¶86 Although unpopular in the legal literature, there are those scholars who 
argue that genital-normalization surgery, if requested by parents, should not be 
prohibited.205 Instead, this minority of scholars argues primarily that parents need 
to be informed of known risks and different treatment options.206 Some scholars 
suggest a model that focuses largely on parental and familial needs, requiring doc-
tors to openly discuss the intersex condition with parents, as well as inform parents 
of all available remedies from a neutral standpoint.207 
¶87 Some scholars believe that it is the legislature, not the judiciary, that is the 
appropriate venue for protecting infants “with any power or consistency.”208 Schol-
ars and intersex activists urge a complete legislative moratorium on early genital-
normalization surgeries on children, contending that parents lack the authority to 
 196. Hofman, supra note 57, at 11. 
 197. Curtis, supra note 85, at 849.
 198. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 42.
 199. Id.
 200. Id. at 43.
 201. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
 202. These limitations are seen in cases concerning organ donation and sterilization of 
minors. Alison Davidian, Beyond the Locker Room: Changing Narratives on Early Surgery for Intersex 
Children, 26 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 1, 18 (2011).
 203. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 163, at 107–08.
 204. Id. at 108.
 205. E.g., Laura D. Hermer, A Moratorium on Intersex Surgeries? Law, Science, Identity, and 
Bioethics at the Crossroads, 13 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 255, 256 (2007).
 206. Id.
 207. Id. at 256–57.
 208. Hofman, supra note 57, at 16.
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consent to these practices because they compromise the children’s fundamental 
right to procreate and the right to bodily integrity.209 Children can manifest 
informed consent autonomously at a later time if they desire treatment.210 
¶88 Some scholars express concern that a moratorium avoids the issue of psy-
chosocial damage to children with intersex traits who must wait for years until 
decision making becomes finalized.211 Other scholars believe that banning genital-
normalization surgeries without also pursuing reconstruction of our societal per-
spective toward sex and gender “puts the proverbial cart before the horse.”212 Schol-
ars advocate legislation recognizing the right to self-identify as a third gender, while 
codifying the expansive judicial interpretations of Title VII in response to the 
increasing awareness of human biological variation. 213 “Statutory reform in the U.S. 
can be an immediate remedy while advocates begin building a constitutional right 
to self-identify outside the gender binary based on the fundamental right to privacy 
and bodily integrity derived from the 14th amendment’s Due Process Clause.”214
¶89 There has been a bit of attempted reform at the state legislative level. In 
2016, Indiana State Representative Ed Clere proposed a bill focused on intersex 
children in state custody or under state supervision to prevent medically unneces-
sary surgery done to “normalize” a child’s physical appearance. While Clere pre-
vented the controversy between parental rights and children’s rights from impeding 
this issue by focusing solely on children in state custody, he believes this will even-
tually be an unavoidable debate.215
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Conclusion
¶90 Recently, there has been heightened interest in the issue of intersexuality 
among government, nongovernmental organizations, and policymakers. The gen-
eral public is exposed now to much more media coverage and human rights state-
ments about intersexuality. The subject is of burgeoning interest in the legal arena. 
This annotated bibliography abstracts articles to provide a reference point as well as 
an understanding of the history of the scholarship in this area. As scholars continue 
to examine intersex issues and various strategies to abolish discriminatory systems, 
I plan to continue building this collection of articles. I fervently hope that scholars 
will continue to document the struggle and continue to propose solutions to enable 
the law to move forward to stop the unfortunate practices that have injured chil-
dren with intersex traits.
